

21 Oct 87

Lessons:

- Effects of secrecy:

(Wf no one else had this understanding: wfy K breakdown negotiations:

- Costs AA

Stat.

- SAM: ~~Costs~~ Cuban did it Castro

K

- K didn't do it.

- Mit, Bunting

- Cuban official

- Firefly

- RFK Cult

- What caused K spies? (Bunting)

- What would have happened if he had not?

(JFK thought - US breakdown.

but, if can had broken down...

if Castro's antelopes had hit...

(Would JFK have "controlled" US

inference to hit SAMs? Would K have

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"controlled" transfer of AC hands to
demolish public trials, or to
export prisoners in Turkey or Berlin? *

Might SC ninjas-man have fired?
(Did they have weapons?)

(* or that they from US was trying to
provide war — with SAC on full
alert? (Vs. McG B: super-threat!)*

SC might have backed down
more & if SAMs had been hit — or
SSMs — without asking even no-invasion pledge;
SSMs moved to prevent US from capturing them!

* see JFK interview on FS in Aug '62;

(Am Arthur Shank, Jan '62

see K comments on interview.

[JFK, McN, seeing "point", thought SC would
be at least as quick to retaliate in Turkey or
Berlin as US was to hit SSMs, or blockade.

Was this true? (Some sovs were killed & maybe)
Would it have been more crazy than US out?
" " " " less likely?

1. The first part of the paper is devoted to a

discussion of the general principles of the

theory of the subject.

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discussion of the general principles of the

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20 Oct 87

A lesson of EMC: (CII)

US could have been put in same
situation as SU: by SAC or ^{U-2, about} Ray action ^{ASW}
or ^{blockade} Mongolia
(= SAM vs. U-2)
or by ally: e.g. Turks:


or Germans!

(Germans, Italians, Germans, South Koreans;
VN?')

Suppose SU had threatened Turkish
missiles — even if US had local non-mc
sup (as in study, then)

Despite US here sup: suppose
Turks had independently shot at SU
mean, and SU, taking this to be USG decision,
said, "One more and you lose SAMs/SSMs
tomorrow morning..."

SEE Ran freeing prisoners; Chiang...



20 Oct 87

CI

Did US win?

Yes

(did it "lose"? (Will) ...

No

Did US settle by
compromise, trade?

No

Do US win because of
conventional sup in
Caribbean? (C in 182)

No

Did US win because of
nuc sup? (CPD

No

or, both?

No

(MCN, Yano, '63)

Did JFK exaggerate risk of war,
on loss of control

No

No

Did US come close to 'losing'?

Yes

Was US sure to "win," if fin?

No

Did US-SU come close to

war - probable?


Yes

reasonable
aversion to
risk -
which he
under-estimated,
not exaggerated.

WITHOUT SOV UA, SHOOTING DOWN U-2

(AND PERHAPS, SAC UA? + ~~SCAL~~ SCAL "UA")

CASTRO AA, AND RFR ULT, US WOULD HAVE
"LOST" (BY JFK'S REASONABLENESS)



20 Oct 87

K/T

RULE IV = VN ; and CMC

The dangerous tendency:

Male leaders' (+ followers)
willingness to "take any risk necessary"
to AVOID LOSS / HUMILIATION / DEFEAT /
LOSS OF STATUS / JOB.

(= Willingness to MASSACRE: "by any means necessary...")


This was a - + Hall's - basic
insight w/rt VN - when "winning"
looked too costly, too dangerous, not
easy to be achieved.

But when "not-losing = VN"
became so costly ^{1965, 1967} as to ensure
losing in next election (1968; 1972),
the LBJ + IV unit for Win [costs of this looked
commensurate to the with costs of "losing election," defeat.]

¹⁹⁷²⁻
In 1973, NIXON and again, finally,
achieved a situation in which not-losing
was cheap enough ~~that~~ not to threaten
prospects in 1973-77 - so they could
forge "win," though the looked like a

pol.

"cin" from perspective of 1964-72.



Oct 10 87

~~Loose Cannon~~ in Cuba:

(Kane Castro, Risher WWII and ^{lost} ~~was the~~ ^{missile} crisis for Khrushchev)

"Controlling the Risks in Cuba" (!) ASWS

(risks really very small)

How

- Players read the cards...

Chess players & o-o

"Cuba was passive, of no influence

("High Power")

JFK - and K - wanted to control the risks;

~~each~~ was ready to fold rather than go to war

on Friday night! (K; but surely, also JFK!

(or, Sat morning)

His colleagues - and others' -

did not start on evening 27th

or morning 27th

(see hippocampus column

Merika memo - on ~~the~~ McN

MacMillan - and way in to Trade

(did he really want a

stick? see his offer to

defence UK missiles.

QSK PAMELA)

1st rock trial, for "our more day,"

to find an alternative to surrender or attack.

JFK - a last ult (not, as he saw it,
"before attacking" - that's what
he told deans in gov + public -
but before backing down.

WJ
- and a last (limited) offer
(secret, indefinite)

- threatened, and feared, his own
loss of control (x "comp" - maybe RFK
did say "comp," or maybe
he said something DoD/K
interpreted as meaning a
comp, or US equivalent.)

if K or Cubans shot another plane

But K had already lost control of
AA - perhaps SAMs - to Cubans!

And with his ult., JFK ^{lost} passed control
of his own forces to Castro, without knowing it.
He pulled "the trigger"

(Of course, Castro already had the trigger; JFK just
increased his control, to that - while seeking to influence
sof & thought he could
K's "decision"
on AA

(Max threat ~~position~~ on AA - which
could have no effect on the prob. that
US would lose a plane!

& Castro could not have been deterred, if
threatened directly; US with game up
recon, or hit ^{base} SAMs and AA (300 batts)
& SSMs?

October 1987

2 - Action for Jackson on Pension Gulf?

1 - Op ed on CMC:

CALL BOB SAMPLE

1) comments on

Oct 27

Rush rev.

Danthoff

2) (Nash)-DE thesis: { AA
RFK ult
Oct 27 trans. }

Case Talbott

on R memo;

get Vol II, or

Pope, SU on SMC

(telcons B)

(fingeret)

(inventory even
U-2 "shootdown")

an BALL

3) ²⁾ Lessons on K + JFK behavior:


"little - airt loss of
control - tomorrow."

b) Ignoring Cuba

c) 25-year LIES.

4) Compare to Pension Gulf crisis
(study?)

3) Learn Wordperfect; shift answer machine
to Jim's office; cancel answer machine...
STORAGE?



Supple

Shultz had

Sunday for 13, 1971

Shultz had been Secretary; the Office
of Management & Budget



CT

21 Oct ^{sent} 8 IPS

Calend Shalene - will send transcript

Wed: Called Julia McCarty NPR
will ~~the~~ send disk of (IPS) Seminar

Called Phila Ruiz - to call back on IPS

Called May V for disk of interview (WGBH)
will send (will send transcript ^{of Oct 27})

Amherst? - parade

I have Tifts tape

Diane Culling: tape of (Nightwatch)

703-476-1290

Called Arlene Weinstock, CBS (11) - will send 553-2129

7:40 ^{EDT} 02 signs KQED

~~Woburn~~

9:40 AM

6:40 Cal

again 8:40 KQED

Thurs + Fri

6:30

8:30

10:30

D at 8:35

88.5 FM

Op Ed

Oct 21 - 87

1. Wf K followed - to supremacy of all, myself still
2. Risk of US-Sov War: JFK vs. "experts"
3. Role of Castro (small allies) (Khrushchev, big)
a enemy
ignored the study now at
the supp)
4. "Signals from K" - (Mod I
for offense)
unilateralism or lack of control ignored.
(to hyp. Mod II, III or IV for offense is
to see "signals" from offense as lying
unreliable, ambiguous; as well as
"his" reading and response to "our"
signals: which must also be assumed
to be ambiguous and unreliable, relative
to "our" intended "message", to expect
Mod II for us (+ III, IV) blows
controlled signal, such as competing
signals, "noise").
5. Lessons, of dangers, loss of control, in Prisoner itself.
6. Willingness of leaders to prolong risks, intensity
the and support thinks, to avoid humiliation:
even when there is strong awareness of high
risks, and leader himself is willing to
settle or strongly tempted: still, he can be

misunderstood (no conf is needed, no
"over-riding leader, victory him,"

in SU — Oct 27 letter — any more than
in US — when JFK had not sent a
letter like K's Oct 26 letter

[but see Kipphan? and Kresky?]

[Stew. at UN?]

but nevertheless, wanted to accept K's
offer, soon (after work & nerves
halted) if not immediately — but was
persuaded not to do this on Saturday...

Both were ready to settle a bit
morning, but prolonged

8. Failure of deterrence: [inferior side makes
provocative mistakes, ^{provokes!}
— K puts missiles in; (^{to improve} his deterrent posture!): despite warnings.
— K does not fold immediately; builds
rapidly; esp., on Oct 27.
— Castro shoots, on 27 Oct & after.

9. Sorely & his own 25 years.

10. Khrushchev, false "lessons" (in fact, leading to VN;
and to SU-US arms race.

[Khrushchev falsely concluded US win was due to US def.


(Brydner / SU wld. came to agree (?) with
US hands that SU loss / US win was
inevitable, gain US confidence / threats
based on US superiority.

But despite ~~that~~ latter, JFK saws "parity",
framed need to use US FU and
consequences of it, and was on verge
of capitulation: so that Khrushchev
would not have had reason to
say, "You Americans will never be able
to do this to us again."

(He + McCloy + all knew "this" was
SU defeat, defeat (^{nearly} zero-~~sum~~)).

Not would R/CPD have had on
evidence of successful use of threat, based
on sup., to point to. (except Berlin? Det.,
not embellish; subjugate (Did K really
mean to carry out his warning — was it
bluff? — wld did he back off?))

[10. New meaning of courage.]



1. On way:

note (2) RPK ult

(to me; none)
RPK

Oct 27 Transcript

(McGraw...)

(McGraw on Anderson)

ult. to address KKK

Thurs; Thurs; etc.

Thurs in canal + print

also with the that; RPK

Final - have one - raised then

OK with of 27 out, but

with the 1st, KKK (KKK)

"Adversity"
1. 11/1



1. On why:

note (2) RFK ult

(to me; ^{RFK} remain;

Oct 27 Transcript

(McGone...)

(McGone can propose, ult. to achieve public finale; Thompson, etc, thought we could + must do better than that; RFK trial - has one-sided than JFK letter of 27 Oct, but better than K letter, public track)

(b) Castro AA

(c) SAM unauthorized ("shock")

SAM being: 1) Milk + Bullets on the, + K shock (Kerthoff)

(d)? "Castro shot down"

tel cons

Statens, Castro, K

2) Milk on Sov official

(Cuban: Shakine)

says Sov general: [Did high official copies to giving order after 10 years?]

3) Fairfight

Maybe after hearing of K Oct 26 proposal?

McGone